Introduction
The recent passage of China WTO bill in US Congress paves the way for eventually granting China Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status on a permanent basis.
As a result, the annual review of China's trading status in the US mandated by the Jackson-Vanik legislation will come to an end. What are the stakes of the permanent NTR? Against the background of the NTR debate in the past 10 years and its prospects after China's WTO entry, the same question can be posed in a different way: what would happen if not granting China NTR? This paper tries to answer this question, with particular reference to Hong Kong's re-export trade and the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA).
The Background of US NTR with China
According to the most-favored-nation treatment principle, the US is required to grant the MFN rates to all WTO members 1 . For non-WTO members, the US grants the MFN rates on a voluntary basis. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 mandates that the MFN granted to a non-market economy be renewed every year. 1 The US has two basic sets of tariff schedules: MFN rates and "Column 2" rates. The MFN rates are determined through multilateral trade negotiations under GATT/WTO and has been declining over several rounds of trade talks; the "Column 2" rates were promulgated in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, a
Depression Era legislation and they have remained unchanged ever since. Based on the author's calculation, the trade-weighted average of the two rates applied to Chinese exports to the US are 5.20% and 44.49% respectively.
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The president has to issue a waiver certifying that the country does not impedes emigration or that providing MFN status will lead to increased emigration. The issue of emigration is the original criteria of renewing the MFN status for countries that include China (Lardy 1994, pp99-101).
China first gained the MFN in 1980 shortly after the two countries established diplomatic ties. Until 1989, its annual renewal had been a low profile issue and gone largely unnoticed, as China gradually relaxed its emigration control and the two countries 6
WTO Membership and NTR
China is in the process of gaining membership into the World Trade Organization.
The common understanding is that WTO membership will guarantee China's MFN in the US and the MFN issue will go away thereafter. This is not true, at least in theory. In order to understand the prospect of the MFN issue, one has to understand the role of the bilateral trade in the overall US-China relations, the underlying motives of the MFN debate, and related clauses in international trade law.
The annual MFN debate has never meant to be a serious policy deliberation, despite high tensions around this issue in years after the Tiananmen crackdown. Due to deeply rooted ideological and political hostility, the relationship between the two countries has never been smooth, especially after the Cold War. Today, the only major area in which the two countries have a common interest is trade, rather than geo-politics 
US-China Trade Patterns
In addition to the complementary nature of the trade pattern in terms of labor and capital endowment, the China-US trade is also characterized with high volume of reexport trade and restricted trade in textile and clothing. As we know, the success of China's opening up owes a great deal to its geographic and ethnic linkage to Hong Kong (Sung, 1991) . On the trade front, thanks to its sophisticated overseas marketing expertise, Hong Kong handles about 75% of US-China trade and has value added to these goods during the re-export process (Fung, 1998) .
China, Hong Kong and the US are contracting parties to MFA, which sets quotas for textile and clothing trade. China and Hong Kong are major exporters of textile and clothing to the US. According to the version 4 GTAP database, China exports $5,161 million worth of textile and clothing to the US in 1995 (11% of its total exports to the US). Hong Kong exports $4,759 million worth of textile and clothing to the US in the same year (28% of its total exports to the US), only second to its service export to the US 9 ($9,165 million). On the US import side, combined imports from China and Hong Kong accounts for over 20% of its total import of textile and clothing.
In assessing the stakes of China's permanent NTR status in the US, the special role of Hong Kong and the binding effects of the MFA in China-US trade deserve particular attentions. This paper will take on these two factors. It is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 lays out the simulation strategy.
Simulation results and their analysis are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Despite being a high-profile policy debate, the MFN issue has motivated only a few quantitative studies. IBERC (1996) First of all, they adopt a two-step simulation strategy: first abolish MFA; and then based on the updated MFA-free database, revoking China's MFN. Effectively, the final result of the two-step simulation is equivalent to removing worldwide MFA and China's MFN simultaneously. Or, the second step of the simulation gives the results of revoking China's MFN in an MFA-free world. While the US can unilaterally relax its MFA quotas from all exporting countries to mitigate the adverse impact of higher price of textile and wearing apparel, it is not up to the US to decide whether or not other countries relax
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MFA quotas as well. Thus, their work is not a simulation of realistic policy actions debated in the US Congress.
Secondly, due to a lack of information on Hong Kong's re-export of Chinese goods, the study is unable to produce the adverse effects of MFN revocation on Hong
Kong. Instead, it shows that Hong Kong benefits from US sanctions against China, which contradicts common sense 6 . As Hong Kong serves as a middleman in US-China trade, business community and policy makers are fully aware of the potential damage done to Hong Kong by the MFN removal. Hong Kong has long maintained a strong lobbying campaign for China's MFN and Hong Kong's prosperity is also a concern for the Clinton Administration when it recommends the annual renewal (Barshefsky 1998 ). 
Simulation Results
In this section, I will first examine the impact of MFN removal for scenario 1, focusing on its impact on trade flow (subsection 4.1) and welfare (subsection 4.2) for related regions. Subsection 4.3 focuses on the interactions between MFN removal, Hong
Kong's re-export and MFA, and their implications for US welfare.
MFN Removal and Re-orientation of Trade Flow

China and US
With MFN removal, the US-China trade will experience serious disruption. As shown in the first column of table 1, a switch of tariff from MFN rates to Column 2 rates cuts down China's exports to the US by 63-86% in all but agricultural and resource material sectors, which experience cuts of 23% and 5% respectively. The declines of trade flow in these two sectors are relatively modest in part because the percentage increases in import prices are modestly 10.3% and 3.0%, compared to average 37.3%; 15 and also in part because demand for food and resource materials is generally inelastic.
With a lower than average tariff raise (25.4%), however, the transport equipment sector experiences the largest drop in export to the US (86%), reflecting that US demand for transport imports from China is more price sensitive.
As the US is a major export destination for Chinese goods, a rise in tariff will force China to turn to other countries for export market. As a result, China's export to all other regions see a substantial increase, for all sectors except textile and wearing apparel to EU and ANC which is subject to MFA quota (second column of table 2). The non-MFN tariffs force the US to switch to other countries for substitutes for Chinese goods.
Positive trade replacement effects occur to almost all countries and sectors, with a few exceptions that include: (1) the decline of its services import from HK, due to shrinking re-export activities associated with China-US trade; and (2) unchanged textile and wearing apparel imports from countries (including Hong Kong) that are subject to MFA quota (third column of table 2).
[insert table 2 here]
To what extent can trade replacement offset trade diversion for the US and China?
Turning to table 3, in value terms, the decline of Chinese exports to the US is offset by the increase of its exports to other regions, but only partially, since the total Chinese exports to the world decline. Similarly, the decline of US imports from China and Hong
Kong is also only partially offset by the increase of its imports from other regions and the 16 US total imports from the world decline. Thus, the overall trade replacement cannot fully cover the trade diversion for both China and US and the two countries have $13.3 and $10.1 billion loss in export and import respectively. This is not a surprise because, with everything else being equal, higher tariffs put an extra constraint on the two countries'
foreign trade, and after all, it is the second best solution for China and US to trade with other regions.
[insert table 3 here]
Hong Kong
Given its special role in China-US trade, the impact of MFN removal on Hong
Kong deserves separate discussions. Hong Kong is a service-dominated economy and the re-export service is an important part of it. As Hong Kong handles about 75% of China's export to the US, its service export to the US associated with China-US trade account for 84% of its total re-export service export. US trade sanctions against China amount to sanctions against Hong Kong's service exports to the US, but not against other sectors. For Hong Kong-US trade, table 4 shows that, the US sanctions against China will result in a 60% decline in Hong Kong's service export but a large rise in other exports. The cause of the sharp decline of service exports is straightforward, but causes of the rise of other exports to the US are two-fold. Firstly, the US import replacement increases its demand for goods produced on other regions that include Hong Kong.
Secondly, the contraction of Hong Kong's services sector pushes resources to other sectors and subsequently increases their exports. Given the fact that the services sector is the dominant sector in Hong Kong's economy, the decline in service exports cuts the overall export value of Hong Kong to the US by $5.7 billion (table 3) , although nonservice exports actually increase. Thus, the impact of the US-China conflict on Hong Kong's exports to the US is mixed: in value term, Hong Kong exports less to the US, but at the sectoral level, 9 out of 10 sectors see improved exports to the US. Although the exports to the US change differently for services and non-service sectors, for other destinations, they appear to be increasing for all sectors except textile and clothing export to MFA contracting regions. This is true also for exports to China, even as China's overall imports decline as a result of a weakened Chinese economy. For services sector, the rise in Hong Kong's export to regions other than the US is the export replacement effect; and the rise in non-services sector export, however, is the result of resource allocation that entails the expansion of these sectors. On the import side, a weakened economy explains the decline in imports from most countries but China. More imports from China are caused by China's export replacement, due to its export diversion from the US. Now let us turn to the third column of table 4 for the effects on Hong Kong's overall foreign trade. On the export side, Hong Kong's non-service exports increase over all regions and I see a net increase in export for all these sectors. For services sector, I
see a net loss in export, as replacement of export to other regions can not fully cover the export diversion from the US. On the import side, the decline in import of all goods except metal from non-China regions outweighs its import rise from China, and thus, I
see a net loss of imports for almost all sectors.
[insert table 4 here]
In summary, countries other than Hong Kong export more to the US and import more from China. At the same time, they export less to China and import less from the US. Thus the flow of goods increases along the China-third country-US route and declines in the reverse direction. The patterns hold across almost all sectors. Hong Kong trades more with China in both import and export; while it exports more to the US (except services), it buys less US goods and services.
What is the impact of a US-China trade conflict on countries' integration with the rest of the world? Table 5 In theory, if a country is more integrated with the rest of the world, its foreign trade will expand along the line of comparative advantage; and vice versa for countries that are further isolated from rest of the world. The following section will show the resulting welfare effects.
Welfare Analysis
The costs and benefits of the trade re-orientation can be evaluated with money metric based welfare measurement in the GTAP model, as detailed in Huff and Hertel (1996) , where welfare changes and their decompositions are measured with the equivalent variations. Table 6 reports the total welfare effects for 4 different scenarios with welfare decomposition for scenario 1. China increased and from US reduced. Since Japan has much higher tariffs on farm products from the US than those from China (98% vs 20%), the loss due to reduced imports from US more than offsets the gain from increased imports from China. As a result, the allocative efficiency loss in Japan is the result of dis-integrated agricultural trade with the US and the pre-existing high tariffs. This is also the case for NIC_HK. In other words, it is not economic integration but economic dis-integration that causes the efficiency loss. After all, despite their allocative efficiency loss, the overall welfare change in the two regions are positive, which is the ultimate indication of benefit from further integration with the world economy, yet ironically, as a result of others' economic dis-integration with the world economy.
MFA, Hong Kong re-export and US Welfare
Above analysis focuses on scenario 1, that is, the US revokes China's MFN with On the other hand, also due to the MFA quota, the pre-sanction import prices for textile and clothing from countries other than China is high and also is the potential of a price drop if the US relaxes the quota restrictions. The small potential of a price rise and the high potential of a price drop together contribute to the reverse of US welfare change from loss to gain. Thus, the US welfare gains not only depend on the US MFA relaxation, but also on other countries that keep the MFA in place on their parts. To further illustrate this, scenario 3 simulates the MFN removal and the worldwide MFA abolition at the same time. In this scenario, the US suffers $58 million loss, compared to $425 million gain in scenario 2. Thus, by sticking to the MFA quota, other countries provide the US with a buffer of $483 (58 + 425) million.
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As stated in the literature review part (section 2), Arce and Taylor (1997) removes the worldwide MFA and MFN simultaneously, but ignores Hong Kong's re-export.
Removing worldwide MFA effectively increase the supply of textile and clothing to other importing countries, which will compete for resources that would be otherwise used for export to the US market. This will increase the cost of US import replacement. Thus, the US welfare loss calculated under this scenario (scenario 3) is over-stated, as compared to 
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